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We propose a new classification of experiments that captures the extent to which the experimental
design and analysis are linked to economic theory. We then use this system to classify all published
field experiments in the five top economics journals from 1975 to 2010. We find that the vast majority
of field experiments (68%) are Descriptive studies that lack any explicit model; 18% are Single Model
studies that test a single model-based hypothesis; 6% are Competing Models studies that test competing
model-based hypotheses; and 8% are Parameter Estimation studies that estimate structural parameters
in a completely specified model. Using the same system to classify laboratory experiments published
over the same period, we find that economic theory has played a more central role in the laboratory
than in the field.  Finally, we discuss in detail three sets of field experiments, on gift exchange, on
charitable giving, and on negative income tax,  that illustrate both the benefits and the potential costs
of a tighter link between experimental design and theoretical underpinnings.
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When it comes to role of theory in their research, empirical microeconomists are 
torn. On the one hand, we devote a large fraction of our graduate instruction to models of 
consumer behavior and firm decision-making, and to the interactions that determine mar-
ket equilibrium. On the other hand, it is not always obvious how these theories are rele-
vant to empirical research. Outside the academy, policy-makers and business leaders of-
ten demand “basic facts” and simplified policy guidance with little or no concern for the-
oretical nuances. 
  How then do empirical economists negotiate between theory and “facts”? In this 
paper, we focus on the role of theory in the rapidly-growing area of field experiments. 
We take an empirical approach and quantify the role of theoretical modeling in all pub-
lished field experiments in five top economics journals from 1975 to 2010. We propose a 
new classification of experimental studies that captures the extent to which the experi-
mental design and analysis is linked to economic theory. Specifically, we distinguish be-
tween four classes of studies: Descriptive studies that lack any explicit model; Single 
Model studies that test a single model-based hypothesis; Competing Models studies that 
test competing model-based hypotheses; and Parameter Estimation studies that estimate 
structural parameters in a completely specified model. Applying the same classification 
to laboratory experiments published over the same period we conclude that theory has 
played a more central role in the laboratory than in field experiments. Finally, we discuss 
in detail three sets of field experiments that illustrate both the potential promise and pit-
falls of a tighter link between experimental design and theoretical underpinnings. 
 
Quantifying the Role of Theory in Field Experiments 
The use of “experimental” (i.e., random-assignment) designs came relatively late 
to economics.
1 Over the last 15 years, however, randomized experiments in field settings 
have proliferated, and in 2010 field experiments represented about 3 percent of the arti-
                                                 
1 According to Forsetlund, Chalmers, and Bjorndal (2007), the earliest documented use of randomization in 
the social sciences was a 1928 study of an intervention designed to reduce the rate at which college stu-
dents were failing at Purdue University. In economics, we are unaware of any study using random assign-
ment prior to the negative income tax experiments in the 1960s (see Greenberg and Shroder, 2004).   4
cles published in the top economics journals. The role of theory in such field experi-
ments, as in other areas of applied economics, ranges from “almost none” to fully model-
based investigations. However, there is a widespread perception that experimental stud-
ies, and particularly field-based random-assignment studies, are disproportionately “black 
box” evaluations that provide only limited evidence on theoretically-relevant mechanisms 
(for example, Deaton, 2010).  
  To assess the actual importance of theoretical modeling in field experiments, and 
compare the relative role of theory in field versus laboratory experiments, we collected 
data on the universe of experimental studies published in five leading economics journals 
– the American Economic Review, Econometrica, the Journal of Political Economy, the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, and the Review of Economic Studies – over the 36-year 
period from 1975 to 2010. After excluding comments, notes, and articles in the annual 
Papers and Proceedings Issue of the American Economic Review, we identified all labor-
atory and field experiments among the remaining articles and classified the role of theory 
in these two sets of studies. 
   
Defining Field Experiments 
A first issue that arises for our analysis is the delineation of what qualifies as an 
“experiment.” We restrict attention to studies based on the random assignment of a pur-
poseful “treatment” or manipulation. We include studies where treatment is deterministi-
cally assigned in a way that can be viewed as equivalent to random, such as assigning 
every second name in a list, or choosing a permutation of potential subjects that optimiz-
es the balance between treatment and control groups. Our definition includes govern-
ment-funded social experiments, such as Moving To Opportunity, which provided 
vouchers for public housing recipients to move out of low-income neighborhoods, 
(Kling, Liebman, and Katz, 2007);  smaller scale research projects like List’s (2003) 
study of sport card dealers;  and randomizations induced by a firm for its own research or 
marketing purposes, like Nagin et al.’s (2002) study of the effects of monitoring on tele-
phone solicitors.  
However, our definition excludes many influential studies that are often viewed as 
“experimental” but lack randomly-assigned treatment and control groups. Bandiera,   5
Barankay, and Rasul’s (2007, 2009) studies of bonus payments to farm managers, for ex-
ample, use a “pre-post” design in which managers are first observed in one regime, and 
then in another.  A similar non-random design is used by Chetty, Looney and Kroft 
(2009) to study the effect of including sales taxes in the posted prices displayed in gro-
cery stores. We also exclude other studies that exploit random variation created for pur-
poses other than the evaluation of treatment, like Angrist’s (1990) study of the Vietnam 
draft lottery or Sacerdote’s (2001) study of randomly-assigned college roommates.  
By restricting attention to studies with random assignment of a purposeful manip-
ulation, we do not mean to criticize papers that use non-randomized designs, or that rely 
on opportunistic randomization. Rather, we use these criteria to narrow our focus to stud-
ies that are closest in spirit to the randomized clinical trials used in medicine and other 
sciences. Advocates of randomized experimental studies often point to these trials as the 
gold standard for scientific evidence, despite the limitations emphasized by Heckman and 
Smith (1995) and Deaton (2010), for example. 
  We include papers that re-analyze data from previous experiments, provided that 
the study uses the original micro data, as in Lalonde’s (1986) analysis of econometric 
methods for program evaluation.  In the terminology of Harrison and List (2004) we in-
clude both “natural field experiments” in which the participants have no knowledge of 
being involved in an experiment and “framed field experiments” in which the participants 
are aware that they participate in an experiment.  
 
Classification of the Role of Theory 
Within this universe of studies, we classify the role of economic theory using a four-
way scheme that we believe captures the centrality of economic theory in a particular 
study. The four categories are: Descriptive (D) studies that lack any formally specified 
model; Single Model (S)  studies that lay out a formal model and test one (or more) quali-
tative implications of the model; Competing Models (C) studies that lay out two or more 
alternative models with at least one contrasting qualitative implication and test between 
them on the basis of this implication; and Parameter Estimation (P) studies that specify a 
complete data generating process for (at least some subset of) the observed data and ob-
tain estimates of structural parameters of the model.   6
  To illustrate our classification system, Table 1 shows four examples from the re-
cent literature that are broadly representative of the four classes. Miguel and Kremer’s 
(2004) study of a deworming treatment program in Kenya provides an interesting exam-
ple of a Descriptive field experiment. The experimental treatment in this study contains 
several elements, including drug treatment and education, and was designed to affect a 
variety of outcomes, including infection rates, school attendance and educational 
achievement. The paper provides no formal model for the experimental program impacts, 
though it does discuss the expected effects on health and education outcomes as well as 
possible channels for these effects, including social spillovers. 
  Single Model experiments lay out a formal model of the experimental impact and 
then evaluate the predictions of this model against the null hypothesis of no difference 
between the treatment and control groups.  To meet the definition of a “formal model” for 
this class we require at least one line of offset mathematical text. (We make no attempt to 
assess the logical completeness of the model specification). We exclude purely statistical 
models or algebraic summaries of the payoffs in laboratory experiments. An illustrative 
example is the paper by Nagin et al. (2002), which includes a simple but formally speci-
fied model that isolates the response of a key endogenous variable (the number of “ques-
tionable” calls claimed by a telephone sales associate) to a manipulation of interest (the 
monitoring rate of questionable calls). The qualitative prediction of the model is then 
tested by contrasting various treatment groups. 
  Although our requirement of a single equation of mathematical text provides an 
easily verified distinction between Descriptive and Single-Model studies, we readily con-
cede that in some cases the line is arbitrary. Consider, for example, a field experiment 
designed to test an implication of a well-known model.  In some cases a referees or editor 
will have asked the authors to remove the formal statement of the model from the paper, 
leading us to classify the paper as Descriptive. In other cases the formal statement re-
mains, leading us to classify the paper as a Single Model study and inducing different 
classifications for papers which are equally informed by theory. Despite this issue, we 
believe that the presence of a mathematical statement of the model is a useful (if crude) 
indicator of the importance of economic theory in the paper.  A formal statement of the 
model helps to clarify the underlying assumptions that the author is maintaining in the   7
study and the specific form of the model that the author is attempting to test in the empir-
ical setting.
2 
  A criticism of studies that focus on testing a single model is that they provide lit-
tle guidance in the event that the model is rejected: Which of the assumptions does the 
data reject? Would alternative models have fared differently? A parallel criticism arises 
when the model is not rejected: Competing models may make the same prediction, so 
simple “one sided” tests do not distinguish between theories (Rabin, 2010). A text-book 
example of the latter problem is provided by Becker (1962), who notes that the finding of 
a downward-sloping demand curve cannot be construed as evidence of utility maximiza-
tion, since demand curves will be downward-sloping even when agents choose randomly, 
as long the budget constraint is sometimes binding. 
  These concerns are partially addressed by Competing Model studies that lay out 
two or more competing models, with differing predictions for the response to a manipula-
tion. The study by Fehr and Goette (2007), for example, compares a standard inter-
temporal labor supply model against an alternative model with reference-dependent pref-
erences. The two models have similar predictions for the response of earnings to a short-
term increase in the effective wage rate, but differing predictions for effort per hour: ef-
fort increases under the standard model, but decreases under reference dependence. The 
latter predictions provide the basis for a test between the models. 
                                                 
2 A useful case to consider is the influential set of findings on the “disposition effect” – that is, on the pro-
pensity to sell stocks that are “winners” rather than “losers” compared to the purchase price. Odean (1999) 
uses a graph and an intuitive explanation to suggest that the phenomenon is explained by prospect theory. 
However, Barberis and Xiong (2009) show that once one actually writes down an explicit model of pro-
spect theory, the disposition effect is not generally predicted by the model. In this case, the intuitive expla-
nation had focused on the concavity and convexity of the value function, but had neglected the effect of the 
kink at the reference point.   8
Study Description Classification
1. E. Miguel and M. Kremer Descriptive
Econometrica, 2004
2. D. Nagin et al. 
American Econ. Rev, 2002
3. E. Fehr and L. Goette
American Econ. Rev, 2007
4. P. Todd and K. Wolpin
American Econ. Rev, 2006
Table 1:  Classification Examples
Notes: Studies selected and summarized by authors.  See text for description of relevant universe of studies, and classification system.
"Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education 
and Health in the Presence of Treatment"
Evaluation of deworming treatment program 
in Kenya. School-level assignment.  




Random assignment of schooling subsidies. 
Village-level assignment. Dynamic structural 
model of fertility and schooling fit to control 




Random assignment of monitoring rate of call-
center employees.  Center-level assignment.  
Model of optimal cheating predicts greated 
cheating when monitoring is reduced. 
"Monitoring, Motivation, and Management: 
The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in 
a Field Experiment"
Random assignment of temporary increase in 
piece rate for bicycle messengers.  
Neoclassical model of intertemporal labor 
supply contrasted with reference-dependent 
preferences.
"Do Workers Work More if Wages Are High? 
Evidence from a Randomized Field 
Experiment"
"Assessing the Impact of a School Subsidy 
Program in Mexico: Using a Social 
Experiment toValidate a Dynamic Behavioral 
Model of Child Schooling and Fertility"
 
 The  fourth  Parameter Estimation category includes studies that analyze field ex-
periments using fully specified models. The estimation of the underlying parameters of 
the model allows for welfare and policy evaluations that are not possible otherwise. An 
interesting example is Todd and Wolpin (2006), who specify a dynamic choice model for 
schooling and fertility decisions of families in rural Mexico. They estimate the model pa-
rameters using data from the control group of the PROGRESA experiment, and then 
compare the predicted versus actual responses for the treatment group, who received fi-
nancial incentives to participate in health, education, and nutrition programs.  
 
The Role of Theory in Experiments Since 1975 
In this section, we turn to a quantitative analysis of the role that theory has played 
in field experiments published in five top journals over the past decades since 1975. To 
provide a useful contrast, we also classified all laboratory experiments published in five 
top journals, including laboratory-like experiments conducted in a field environment (la-
beled “artifactual field experiments” in Harrison and List, 2004).   9
  Figure 1 displays a count of all published field and laboratory experiments under 
these definitions. In addition, Table 2 lists all the field experiments classified, with the 
classification by the content of theory, as well as a rough categorization by field, and a 
measure of impact using a count of Google Scholar citations as of April 2011. 
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
Until the mid-nineties the number of field experiments published in top journals was 
small. Between 1975 and 1984, eight field experiment were published in top-five 
journals, seven of which are analyses of the negative income tax experiments discussed 
later in this paper. Between 1985 and 1994, four more field experiments were published, 
including the Blank (1991) study of the impact of double anonymity in the refereeing 
process. Nearly all of these early field experiments are broadly in the area of labor 
economics, and they include several highly influential papers by the number of citations, 
including the LaLonde (1986) study of program evaluation methods (984 citations). 
  Since 1995, the number of field experiments has increased steadily, while the 
diversity of subject matter has also expanded to include such areas as behavioral 
economics (15 papers by our count), development economics (15 papers), public 
economics (13 papers, including the charity experiments), and industrial organization (8 
papers, including the auction experiments). Since 1995, the authors with the most 
published field experiments by our categorization are John List (12 papers), Dean Karlan 
(5 papers), Esther Duflo (4 papers), and Joshua Angrist, Marianne Bertrand, Uri Gneezy, 
James Heckman, Lawrence Katz, Jeffrey Kling, Michael Kremer, Jeffery Liebman, and 
Sendhil Mullainathan (all with 3 papers each). 
  In the past six years the number of field experiments published has averaged 8-10 
per year. Over our 36-year sample period, a total of 84 field experiments were published 
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Figure 1. Number of laboratory and field experiments published in five top econom-
ics journals from 1975 to 2010 
  Compared to field experiments, laboratory experiments are far more common. In 
every year since 1981, more laboratory experiments than field experiments were pub-
lished in the top-five journals. Between 1985 and 1995, the number per year ranged from 
five to ten, resulting in a total of 82 laboratory experiments, compared to only five field 
experiments in the same period. The flow of published laboratory experiments increased 
even further to 15-25 articles per year from 2005 to 2010. Indeed, in 2010, laboratory ex-
periments account for 9.3 percent of all articles in these five top journals, compared to 2.5 
percent for field experiments. The total number of laboratory experiments in our sample 
is 308, three and one-half times the number of field experiments. 
 The  American Economic Review accounts for 54 percent of all laboratory studies 
in our data, followed by Econometrica (19 percent) and the Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics (13 percent). Field experiments are more evenly distributed across journals, with 
the American Economic Review (35 percent) and the Quarterly Journal of Economics (27   11
percent) publishing the most, followed by Econometrica (19 percent). Within each of the-
se journals, the trends over time are similar to the ones documented in Figure 1. 
  How many of these experiments fall into each of our four categories for the con-
tent of theory? Figure 2 shows the numbers in each category for field experiments for the 
initial decade of our sample period (1975-84), and for subsequent five-year periods (ex-
cept for 2005-2010, which includes 6 years).  
Interestingly, the field experiments published from 1975 to 1984 were all model-based: 
nearly all these papers used labor supply models to study the negative income tax exper-
iments. The few field experiments published in 1985-89 and 1990-94 were all descrip-
tive; so too were the eight field experiments published from 1995 to 1999. Among the 21 
field experiments published in the 2000-04 period, 17 are descriptive while 4 have a 
higher theoretical content (as judged by our criteria): two with a Single Model, one with 
Competing Models, and one study with Parameter Estimation. The first field experiment 
with an explicit theoretical framework published in the post-1984 period is the Nagin et 
al. (2002) paper described above (in the American Economic Review). In the most recent 
2005-2010 period theory has played a more important role in field experiments, with ten 
experiments with a Single Model, four with Competing Models, and one study with Pa-
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Figure 2. Field experiments by theoretical content 
 
  Overall, 68 percent of the 86 field experiments published in top-five journals are 
Descriptive, 18 percent contain a Single Model, 6 percent contain Competing Models, and 
8 percent of field experiments contain a model with Parameter Estimation. 
  The patterns are quite similar across journals, including Econometrica and the Re-
view of Economic Studies. While empirical papers in these two journals are in general 
more likely to include models, in the case of field experiments the models are typically 
statistical, rather than economic models. 
Using the citation counts, we evaluate the impact of the different categories of 
field experiment. In the period from 1995 to 2004, among papers with at least 200 cita-
tions, 16 out of 18 studies (89 percent) are Descriptive, which is in line with the share 
among all field experiments in those years (25 out of 29 studies). In the period from 2005 
on, among papers with at least 100 citations, 8 of 13 (62 percent) are Descriptive, which 
is again in line with the overall share in this period (28 out of 43 studies). This evidence,   13
which is necessarily tentative given the small sample size, suggests that the citation-based 
measure of impact is similar across studies with different theoretical content. 
 
  Next, we consider the break-down by modeling content for laboratory experi-
ments, as shown in Figure 3. The results are quite different, While the descriptive type of 
experiments has been, and remains, the most common type of laboratory experiment, 
model-based experiments (either with a single model or with competing models) have 
been relatively common since the 1970s. The main discernible trend in the last decade is 
an increase in the number of laboratory experiments with parameter estimation. This lat-
ter category includes, among others, the estimation of quantal response equilibria models, 
which provide a solution to game theory problems in a situation of bounded rationality; 
models of k-levels of thinking, in which the decisions of agents depend on how many 
levels of iteration they perform and they think other players will perform; and differing 
aspects of time and risk preferences. 
  Overall, it is clear that the role of explicit theoretical models is very different in 
laboratory than in field experiments: 26 percent of the laboratory experiments contain a 
Single Model, 9 percent contain Competing Models, and 19 percent of papers contain a 
model with Parameter Estimation, while only about one-half (46 percent) are Descriptive 
in nature. 
  These patterns differ by journal. In particular, Econometrica and the Review of 
Economic Studies have a higher incidence of model-based experiments than the other 
journals. In the last decade, the most common type of laboratory experiment in these two 
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Figure 3. Laboratory experiments by theoretical content 
 
.  This brief historical review shows how different the role of theory is in laboratory 
and field experiments. Models have always played a key role in laboratory experiments, 
with an increasing trend. Field experiments have been largely descriptive, with only a 
recent increase in the role for models. In the two journals in our group of five typically 
most devoted to theory, Econometrica and the Review of Economic Studies, the most 
common laboratory experiment in the last decade is an experiment with a model and in-
cluding Parameter Estimation, while the most common field experiment is descriptive. 
  The question then arises: What would be gained, and what would be lost, if field 
experiments were more like laboratory experiments, with respect to theory? We discuss 
this question using three exemplar types of field experiments: gift exchange experiments, 
charitable giving field experiments, and negative income tax studies. 
 
Gift Exchange Field Experiments 
Akerlof (1982) argued that a gift exchange mechanism between employers and 
employees can play an important role in labor markets. If employees respond to a kind   15
wage offer by working harder, employers may find it optimal to offer wages above the 
reservation utility. Gift exchange, hence, is a possible rationale for efficiency wages.  
This theory has proven hard to test empirically. For one thing, the repeated nature 
of employment contracts makes it difficult to separate genuine gift exchange from repeat-
ed game equilibria, in which the worker exerts extra effort in anticipation of future com-
pensation and so on. In a genuine gift exchange, instead, the worker exerts extra effort 
because the “gift” by the employer induces pro-social behavior towards the employer. 
  In a highly-cited laboratory study, Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) test for gift 
exchange. In the experiment, some subjects are assigned the role of firms, others the role 
of workers. Firms move first and make a wage offer ...} , 10 , 5 , 0 { ∈ w . Workers then 
choose effort  ] 1 , 1 . 0 [ ∈ e . Workers and firms engage in one-shot interactions, so repeated-
game effects are eliminated by design. Since effort is costly, the subgame perfect equilib-
rium strategy for self-interested workers is to exert the minimal effort  1 . 0 =
∗ e , no matter 
what the wage offer. In anticipation of this, self-interested firms should offer workers 
their reservation utility, in this case  30 =
∗ w . 
  Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl observe behavior that is starkly different from these 
predictions. Almost all subjects in the role of firms offer wages higher than 30, and sub-
jects in the role of workers respond by exerting higher effort, as shown in Figure 4. This 
is precisely, in a laboratory setting, the gift exchange that Akerlof (1982) postulated. The 
reciprocal behavior of the workers makes it rational for firms to offer efficiency wages. A 
number of laboratory experiments have confirmed and extended the findings of this pa-
per.   16
 
Figure 4: Gift Exchange in a Laboratory Experiment 
Source: Reproduced from Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993). 
 
  As interesting as this evidence is, one may argue that behavior in an actual em-
ployment contract differs from behavior in the laboratory. Yet, employment relationships 
with their repeated nature make testing of gift exchange behavior very difficult. 
  Gneezy and List (2006) designed a field experiment that resolves this difficulty. 
They hire workers for two tasks, coding library books and running a fund-raising drive. 
They make it clear that the jobs are one-time tasks, hence removing repeated-interaction 
incentives. Once subjects show up for their task, a sub-set is randomly assigned a surprise 
pay of $20 per hour, while the control group is paid $12 per hour, as promised. Gneezy 
and List then examine whether effort responds to the higher pay, as predicted by the gift 
exchange hypothesis. Notice that the higher pay is a fixed payment per hour, and as such 
does not alter the incentives to exert effort. The main finding in the paper is that work 
effort is substantially higher in the first three hours of the job in the gift treatment relative 
to the control treatment, but it is indistinguishable after that. This suggests that gift ex-
change is present, but short-lived. This innovative design spawned a whole literature of 
field experiments using similar short-term, but real, employment contracts.   17
  What neither Gneezy and List (2006) nor most of the follow-up papers do is to 
provide a model for the observed behavior. As such, they are Descriptive field experi-
ments. However, while gift exchange is indicative of non-standard preferences (else the 
worker would not reciprocate in a one-shot interaction), various models of social prefer-
ences can explain the evidence. 
Two prominent classes of explanations are inequity aversion and reciprocity. Un-
der inequity aversion, put forward by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000), individuals dislike inequity: while individuals do want higher payoffs for them-
selves, they are willing to forgo some payoff to help another player who is behind them – 
though not someone who is ahead of them. This simple model of social preferences has 
been successful in accounting for behavior in a variety of contexts, including behavior in 
the dictator game, the ultimatum game, and gift exchange in the laboratory. In the Fehr et 
al. (1993) experiment, the “firm” falls behind by paying a (higher) wage. The worker can 
mitigate this inequity by exerting effort which benefits the firm with, at least initially, 
limited cost (since the cost function is convex). The model also predicts that the worker 
will not put this effort if the firm has not paid a generous wage. In this latter case, the 
firm is ahead in payoffs and putting in effort would increase, not decrease, inequality. 
  Under reciprocity models instead (such as the intention-based models in Rabin, 
1993, and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004, or type-dependent preferences in Levine, 
1998, or action-based models as in Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj, 2008), individuals have 
positive social preferences towards others who they think are nice or behave nicely, but 
not (as much) towards individuals who are not nice. Under these models, workers exert 
effort if the firm pays a higher wage in the laboratory gift exchange game because of the 
inference workers make about how nice the firm is. Conversely, they do not exert effort 
under a low wage because they do not care for firms that prove to be selfish. 
  Can gift exchange experiments in the field then help separate the two explana-
tions? It is simple to show that they do, even though this point has not been made in the 
papers cited above. The inequity aversion model predicts gift exchange in the laboratory 
because the generous wage payment by the firm causes the firm to fall behind in payoffs 
relative to the worker, triggering the inequity-diminishing effort by the worker. But in the 
field experiment, it is highly implausible that a higher wage payment by the firm for a   18
six-hour task causes the firm to fall behind in payoffs relative to the workers. But if the 
“gift” payment does not alter the inequity between the worker and the firm, it will not 
induce gift exchange behavior. Hence, any observed gift exchange in firms cannot be due 
inequity aversion but to other social preferences such as reciprocity. This point applies to 
other economic settings where gifts are given to influence behavior, such as gifts to doc-
tors in the pharmaceutical industry (Malmendier and Schmidt, 2010), or vote-buying in 
the case of politicians (Finan and Schechter, 2010).  These gift-exchange patterns cannot 
be explained by inequity aversion, but only by some of the existing reciprocity-based 
theories. 
  Adding a simple model of two (or more) competing social-preference models 
would thus add insights beyond the Descriptive contribution of the field experiments. 
Moreover, using a model of reciprocal preferences, one can ask how much reciprocity is 
implied by the observed gift exchange in the field. In Gneezy and List (2006), the in-
crease in pay raises productivity in book coding (temporarily) by 30 percent. But did that 
gain require great effort, in which case it indicates substantial reciprocation, or only a 
minimal increase in effort, and thus not much reciprocation? Estimating the extent of rec-
iprocity would require knowing the shape of the cost function of effort. This can be done 
by randomizing the piece rate. As such, additional experimental treatments can be de-
signed to estimate the nuisance parameters (in this case the curvature of the cost of effort) 
and shed light on the parameters of interest (the extent of reciprocity). 
  To summarize, the gift exchange experiments suggest that there is an important 
role played by both types of experimental evidence: The laboratory experiments in Fehr 
et al. (1993) were the first to suggest an experimental methodology to test for gift ex-
change, and found support for it in the laboratory. The Gneezy and List (2006) field ex-
periment was a milestone in that it proposed a design for gift exchange in a real employ-
ment contract unconfounded by repeated game effects. While this field experiment falls 
in the Descriptive category, follow-up modeling can clarify its implications for the body 
of theory on social preferences. Furthermore, studies that structurally estimate these pa-
rameters could build on the design of Gneezy and List. Scientific progress is often 
achieved by a sequence of papers, each adding to the previous work. 
   19
Charitable Giving Field Experiments 
  A series of field experiment have transformed the charitable giving field from an 
area mostly focused on modeling and stylized facts to one focused on experimental find-
ings. A trail-blazing field experiment was List and Lucking-Reiley (2002). In a mailer 
requesting funds for a research center, the authors randomized both the seed money (the 
funding already available) and whether funds would be refunded in case the fund-raising 
targets were not met. This experiment was motivated by Andreoni’s signalling model of 
charitable giving. However, since the List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) paper does not con-
tain a model, we categorize it as Descriptive. Most recent field experiments in the area 
follow List and Lucking-Reiley: they are motivated by models on charitable giving, but 
they are ultimately Descriptive (for example, Falk, 2007). 
  In this Section, we discuss the role that theory played in a field experiment on 
charitable giving run by two of the authors of this paper, Stefano DellaVigna and Ulrike 
Malmendier, together with John List. The idea of the paper was to attempt to discriminate 
between two sets of reasons for giving to a charity when asked for a donation. One reason 
is that the act of giving is associated with a utility increase, whether due to altruism, 
warm glow, or prestige. Alternatively, individuals may actually dislike giving money to a 
charity but feel worse saying no to the solicitor. In this case charity giving is due to the 
social pressure that the individuals experience when being asked. These two motivations 
for giving have very different welfare implications for the giver: giving is welfare-
increasing for the donor in the first case, but welfare-diminishing for the donor in the se-
cond case. 
  In the discussion of the experimental design, we settled on a door-to-door cam-
paign where we would randomize the extent to which people are informed about the up-
coming fund-raising campaign. In the treatment group, but not in the control group, we 
would post a flyer on the door-knob of the household, reproduced in Figure 5, informing 
them of the upcoming fund-raiser. Households could then vote with their feet—if giving 
is mostly due to altruism, households in the treatment group would sort into staying at 
home and give; if giving is mostly due to social pressure, they would sort out to avoid 
being asked.   20
 
Figure 5. Example of the flyer in a charitable giving experiment 
Source: Flyer used by DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (2010). 
 
  The initial plan for the field experiment was in the Descriptive line of previous 
work: we intended to test a hypothesis which was intuitively suggested by theory, but 
without actually making the underlying model explicit. After some discussion, though, 
we decided to write down a model to clarify what assumptions we were implicitly mak-
ing. We assumed a cost function of shifting the probability of being at home (in response 
to the flyer), and we allowed for competing models to explain sorting and giving behav-
ior: altruism on the one hand and a social pressure cost from turning down an in-person 
giving request on the other hand. 
  In our case, the dividends from writing the model were substantial. In addition to 
clarifying the assumptions needed (for example, that there is no social pressure cost from 
avoiding the solicitor by not answering the door), the model suggested novel predictions. 
One such prediction relates to the size of donations. In our model, social pressure drives 
small donations, but not larger ones.  Hence, if social pressure is responsible for the ob-  21
served donations, the flyer treatment should lower small donations, but not larger ones. 
The model also suggested new treatments. In particular, we added an “Opt-Out” treat-
ment in which the flyer includes a box that can be checked if the household does not 
“want to be disturbed.” This treatment makes sorting easier—that is, it lowers the cost of 
avoiding the solicitor relative to the regular flyer without opt-out box. Hence any (addi-
tional) decrease in giving allows us to identify social pressure more directly and to ad-
dress confounding explanations such as information or self- and other-signaling models. 
  In summary, making the model explicit before running the experiment made for a 
tighter and more informative test of the initial hypothesis.  
In addition, we realized that, were it not for one nuisance parameter, we would be 
able to estimate the key parameters of the model, including the social pressure cost of 
saying no to an in-person request, and the extent of altruism. The nuisance parameter is 
the elasticity of the cost of sorting in and out of the home, a key parameter to make infer-
ences. Suppose for example that the flyer reduces the probability of home presence by 4 
percentage points – should that be considered much or is little? Unfortunately, none of 
the experimental treatments allowed us to “monetize” the magnitude and estimate this 
elasticity parameter. 
  This led us to think of other ways to estimate this parameter. In the end, while still 
in the design stage, we decided to run a parallel field experiment specifically designed for 
the purpose. We posted flyers announcing that “Researchers will visit this address tomor-
row ( / ) between … and … to conduct an X-minute survey. You will be paid $Y for your 
participation.” Across treatments we varied the time duration X (5 or 10 minutes) and the 
payment Y ($0, $5, or $10). The responsiveness in the presence at home with respect to 
the duration and the payment provided the identification to the elasticity parameters, 
hence allowing us to back out all other parameters. Indeed, in the end these survey treat-
ments made up the bulk of our field experiment, even though their only purpose was to 
estimate a nuisance parameter. 
  The reduced-form results in DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier (2010) point to the 
importance of social pressure for solicited donations, with the most important piece of 
evidence being the fact that the flyer with opt-out option lowers donations significantly, 
and especially small donations. As discussed above, this is a key prediction of the social   22
pressure framework which we had not honed in until we wrote the model. As such, writ-
ing the model provided us with a tighter reduced-form test. 
  What do the survey treatments and the ensuing parameter estimation add to these 
results? We estimate the effect of a fund-raising campaign on the welfare of the house-
holds contacted. In a model with no social pressure, the welfare effect of a campaign can 
only be positive, since a donor can always costlessly say no. But in the presence of social 
pressure, this free-disposal condition does not hold: the benefits of a campaign for the 
willing donors have to be weighed against the cost non-donors pay for being asked and 
saying no, which we estimate to be about $4 for a local charity. In addition to this cost for 
non-donors, we estimate that as many as 50 percent of the donors would have preferred 
not to be asked, because social pressure induces them to give when they would not have 
given otherwise, or give more than they otherwise would.  
  Taking into account these forces, our benchmark specification indicates that our 
door-to-door campaign induces a welfare loss of about $1 on average per household con-
tacted (including households that were not at home and hence did not suffer a welfare 
loss, and not counting the benefits associated with the public good provision). An inter-
esting and counterintuitive result is that raising money for the local and well-liked favor-
ite charity is associated with more negative welfare impacts than raising money for an 
out-of-state and lesser-known charity. More people are willing to donate to the local char-
ity, but at the same time, the social pressure cost of saying “no” to the local charity is sig-
nificantly higher, and the second force dominates. These latter findings, which of course 
require some parametric assumptions, complement the descriptive findings. 
 
Negative Income Tax Experiments 
 
  The two previous examples suggest that, in many experimental settings, much can 
be gained from a careful consideration of the predictions of economic models. But is it 
always advantageous to have a model with parameter estimation? In this Section we con-
sider the case of the negative income tax experiments, one of the most famous large-scale 
social experiments conducted in the United States. Funded by the Office of Economic 
Opportunity from 1968 to 1972, this experiment was designed to test the effects of a neg-  23
ative income tax – a simplified two-parameter income support system proposed by Mil-
ton Friedman in the 1950s involving a guaranteed baseline amount of income (the first 
parameter), which is then phased out at a constant rate (the second parameter) as income 
is earned. Dozens of high-profile economists were involved in the design and analysis of 
this experiment. 
  The experimental design was closely tied to a specific parametric model: Rather 
than implement a simple “two-group” experimental design, the experiment included a 
total of eight different treatment arms, each with a specific value for the “guarantee level” 
(that is, the level of income support for a family with no earnings) and for the program 
tax rate. A complex optimal assignment model, developed by John Conlisk and Harold 
Watts, was designed to maximize the efficiency of the experiment, assuming a (paramet-
ric) model of the likely responses to the experimental incentives.  
  In principle, the design could have provided estimates of the incentive effects of 
various combinations of the guarantee level and tax rate. However, with the very small 
sample sizes (1,350 subjects, with 750 members of the treatment group, and 46-138 
treatments per arm), even the pooled experimental impacts were quite imprecise. The on-
ly possible inferences that could be made from the data were under the assumption of the 
structural model. 
  Similarly complex designs were employed in the Rural Income Maintenance Ex-
periment (operated in Iowa and North Carolina between 1969 and 1973), the Gary In-
come Maintenance Experiment (operated in Gary Indiana between 1971 and 1974), and 
the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiment (SIME-DIME), which ran between 
1971 and 1982. As in the earlier negative income tax experiments, the SIME-DIME ex-
periment was hampered by a small sample size – the SIME-DIME sample would have 
had to have been eight times larger to yield statistically significant treatment effect esti-
mates for even the largest arm of the design. 
  From today’s perspective, the obvious comfort that analysts at the time had with a 
model-based assigned mechanism is surprising. Equally remarkable, perhaps, was the 
nearly universal adoption of model-based analysis methods for the negative income tax 
experiments (for example, see the analysis in Johnson and Pencavel, 1982). As pointed   24
out by Ashenfelter and Plant (1990), the final report of the SIME-DIME experiment did 
not include any “non-parametric” estimates of the impact of treatment.  
  As a result of the frustrations in dealing with the complex designs of the negative 
income tax experiments (and with the confusing message that emerged from such de-
signs) many respected analysts adopted the view that social experiments should be de-
signed as simply as possible. For example, Hausman and Wise (1985, p. 188) argued: 
“[W]e propose as a guiding principle the experiments should have as a first priority the 
precise estimation of a single or a small number of treatment effects.” Subsequent social 
experiments – particularly those that focus on new programs –have tended to follow this 
advice. As noted by Greenberg, Shroder and Onstott (1999) in this journal, 80 percent of 
the social experiments initiated after 1983 had only a single treatment-control contrast. 
This shift away from designs that explicitly attempt to model response variation to multi-
ple treatments and toward a single manipulation has led to a new round of criticism that 
the social experiments are often “black boxes” that “… contribute next to nothing to the 





  Over the last two decades, economics has witnessed a dramatic expansion of ex-
perimental research. Both laboratory and field experiments share the common advantage 
of studying a controlled setting in order to evaluate treatment effects. There is, however, 
as we documented, a noticeable difference in the evolution of these two types of experi-
mental research: Laboratory experiments feature a much closer link to theory than field 
experiments.  
Examples from studies of gift exchange and charitable giving illustrate that, while 
we can certainly learn from descriptive studies, developing a fully specified behavioral 
model and obtaining estimates of the key parameters from that model can provide addi-
tional insights. This process can follow from models and estimates that are obtained in 
follow-up papers, as may happen for the gift exchange experiments, or could be part of 
the design of the initial field experiment, as in the charity experiment described above. In   25
this way, field experiments need not differ from laboratory experiments with respect to 
the guiding role that theory can play in testing hypothesis on behavior. 
 The negative income tax experiment, on the other hand, makes it clear that there 
is no simple answer as to the optimal role of modeling in field experiment. Reliance on a 
model is not always a plus, particularly in the evaluation of complex social programs that 
may affect a range of behaviors through multiple channels. 
   26
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2010 2 QJE 1-45 Cohen, Jessica and Pascaline Dupas Free Distribution or Cost-Sharing? Evidence from a Randomized Malaria Prevention Experiment Single Model 41 Development
2010 2 QJE 263-305 Bertrand, Marianne, Karlan, Dean, Mullainathan, SeWhat's Advertising Content Worth? Evidence from a Consumer Credit Marketing Field ExperimentSingle Model 51 Behavioral
2010 4 JPE 274-299 Levav, Jonathan, Heitmann, Mark, Herrmann, Andre Order in Product Customization Decisions: Evidence from Field Experiments Descriptive 10 IO
2010 5 QJE 515-548 Jensen, Robert The (Perceived) Returns to Education and the Demand for Schooling Descriptive 37 Development
2010 5 QJE 729-765 Anderson, Eric T. and Duncan I. Simester Price Stickiness and Customer Antagonism Descriptive 15 IO
2010 6 AER 958-83 Landry, Craig E., Lange, Andreas, List, John A., Pri Is a Donor in Hand Better Than Two in the Bush? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment Single Model 5 Public
2010 9 AER 1358-98 Chen, Yan, Harper, F. Maxwell, Konstan, Joseph anSocial Comparisons and Contributions to Online Communities: A Field Experiment on MovieLens Single Model 22 Behavioral
2010 12 AER 2383-2413 Ashraf, Nava, Berry, James and Jesse M. Shapiro Can Higher Prices Stimulate Product Use? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Zambia Competing Models 51 Development
Table 2, Panel B. List of all Field Experiments Published in Top-5 Journals from 2006 to 2010
Notes: List of all papers published in top-5 journals from 1975 to 2010 which we classify as field experiments. For the categorization into 4 types by the role of theory, see text. The Google Scholar cite count is as of April 2011.  